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Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? 
The Enlarged EU and its Uncertain Constitution 
Sebastian Kurpas and Justus Schönlau* 
 
The assertion that the enlarged EU will become 
dysfunctional under the current treaty provisions 
has been one of the strongest arguments in favour 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Also after the two 
‘no’ votes to the text, political leaders continue to 
see the necessity of institutional reform. Jacques 
Chirac and Tony Blair, neither of whom is keen 
to resume the ratification process as such, have 
stressed independently that the issue needs to be 
addressed in the near future. The British Prime 
Minister argues that the EU cannot function 
properly with 25 member states under today’s 
rules of governance, adding “Having spent six 
months as EU president, I am a good witness of 
that.”
1 His French counterpart even predicted 
that the status quo would eventually “condemn 
the EU to inertia and paralysis.”
2 
A growing number of political leaders have 
signalled their intention to resolve this impasse 
by discarding the Constitution as an integral 
document and ‘cherry-picking’ certain 
provisions.
3 We argue that this would be highly 
regrettable as leaders would then forfeit the 
most compelling quality of the Constitution: its 
powerful symbolic value as a statement in 
support of a re-enforced political union. 
This Policy Brief investigates whether the 
Constitution’s coming into force would make a 
decisive difference compared to the status quo. 
In the first part the authors therefore take a 
closer  look  at  concrete  institutional  aspects to  
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1 Tony Blair, speech on the Future of Europe, Oxford, 2 
February 2006 (http://www.pm.gov.uk/output). 
2 Jacques Chirac, New Year’s address to the Diplomatic 
Corps, Paris, 10 January 2006 (http://www.elysee.fr). 
3 See Annexes 1 and 2 for details on the state of the debate. 
illustrate how the EU is currently performing. At the 
same time they ask whether the Constitutional 
provisions would have changed the Union’s 
efficiency decisively for the better. In the second part 
the issue is put into a broader context analysing 
especially the Constitution’s symbolic importance 
and its implications for the balance of power between 
the EU institutions. Annexes 1 and 2 offer an 
overview of the debate and scenarios for the future of 
the Constitutional process as of February 2006. 
I. The impact of enlargement on the EU’s 
institutional functioning: So far, so good 
Over the past few months, the ‘cost’ incurred by not 
having a constitution has been a question posed with 
growing frequency, but so far no satisfactory answer 
has been given. This is partly due to the speculative 
nature of the question: How would the EU function 
with a Constitution that it currently does not have? 
While many predict a deep crisis in the basic 
functioning of the Union in a not too distant future, 
others claim that the institutions are actually coping 
with enlargement quite well and that this might 
continue to be the case. The question is thus whether 
there is reason for optimism or whether the current 
situation resembles that of a person jumping off the 
roof of a house calling out: “Until here, everything 
went well…” And if the latter were the case, would 
the Constitutional Treaty really provide the rescue net 
that could ensure a soft landing for the EU? A look at 
the different institutions and some of the key changes 
that the Constitution would have introduced helps to 
shed some light on these questions. 
1. The double majority system (Art. I-25) 
Innovations affecting the Council are the ones cited 
most frequently when arguments in favour of the 
Constitutional Treaty are made. One central element 
was supposed to be the new rules for the weighting of 
member states’ votes under qualified majority voting 
(qmv), which were designed to reduce the danger of 
blockage in a more diverse Union. Calculations have 
proved that the introduction of the ‘double majority 
system’ would indeed make it much easier to avoid 
the formation of blocking minorities with 25 member 
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states.
4 So far, however, figures on the voting reality 
do not confirm the widespread fear of deadlock after 
enlargement while the Nice system of weighting 
votes is still in place.
5 This can be explained by the 
fact that voting has not become more frequent and 
still represents the exception. Even when votes are 
taken, usually only one or two countries vote against 
or abstain, just as it was the case before enlargement. 
Interviews with Council officials indicate that the 
tradition of consensus-building has been maintained 
after enlargement, which implies that voting 
continues to be avoided when possible. Member 
states still try to accommodate each other’s interests, 
so that the advantage of the new system would only 
unfold if this ‘consensus culture’ were to change in 
the future. Observers also mentioned that the larger 
number around the table since enlargement has 
indeed lead to atmospheric changes that make 
consensus-building more time-consuming. It is 
questionable, however, whether mechanical changes 
to the voting system would actually serve as an 
adequate substitute, if this culture of consensus were 
to dissipate over time. The main advantage of the 
double majority system thus lies rather in its greater 
transparency and the justifiability of the weighting of 
the votes, which would improve the overall 
legitimacy of majority decisions. 
2. Qualified majority voting as a rule (Art. I-
23.3) & the extension of its application 
More important in terms of efficiency than the actual 
voting weights seems to be the difference between 
issues decided under unanimity and those decided 
under (whatever kind of) qmv. The mere possibility 
of proceeding to a vote is likely to change the logic of 
negotiations, because the technique of taking one 
issue ‘hostage’ in order to obtain concessions on 
another (sometimes unrelated) issue will not work 
anymore under qmv. While under unanimity any 
member state can block a decision, under qmv this 
would only be the case if the member state in 
question used its position to ‘swing’ the vote from 
adoption to rejection. In practice, however, that has 
never succeeded under qmv so far. The extension of 
qmv would thus contribute to more efficiency. There 
are still no reliable data to confirm that more projects 
are blocked under unanimity now than before 
enlargement, but the potential with 25 member states 
is certainly greater than with 15. So far member 
states have not shown a general change in attitude 
                                                        
4 Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén, “Council Voting in 
the Constitutional Treaty – Devil in the Details”, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 53, July 2004 (http://shop.ceps.be). 
5 Statistics from the Council provided to the authors 
actually show a disproportionately low number of negative 
votes or abstentions among the 10 new member states 
during the years 2004 and 2005.  
when they have a veto, and observers from within the 
system insist that no ‘old versus new’ split as such 
has emerged. However, the initial positions of certain 
old member states on the services directive or on the 
continuing restrictions on access to their labour 
markets on the one hand and the position of some 
new member states on the VAT exemptions on the 
other suggest that negotiations on important dossiers 
may become more difficult in the future. While the 
Constitutional Treaty would have introduced qmv as 
the regular voting procedure and altogether about 50 
articles would have either moved from unanimity or 
would have been newly introduced under qmv, it 
must be stated clearly that none of the issues that 
have been problematic since enlargement would have 
actually come under qmv. 
3. Permanent European Council president 
(Art. I-22) 
An important change that would occur in the Council 
is the introduction of a permanent president of the 
European Council. The system of the rotating 
presidency had been criticised even before 
enlargement for its lack of coherence and the 
constant change in priorities. Although there are 
already mechanisms in place to coordinate the efforts 
of each 6-month presidency with the one preceding 
and following it, it is obvious that each government 
uses the position to promote issues that are in its own 
special interest. A permanent president, who would 
be elected for a term of two and a half years, 
renewable once, would be in a better position to 
provide continuity. After the last enlargement, 
member states will only hold the presidency every 12 
½ years, so that the argument of fostering a sense of 
‘ownership’ towards the EU has become less 
pertinent. Also, European summits now mean that 
there is a considerably higher number of delegations 
in the room and ‘running’ the Union of 25 generally 
puts a larger burden on the presidency. The European 
Council, which “shall provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and shall 
define the general political guidelines thereof” (Art. 4 
TEU), finds itself in an increasingly difficult position 
to fulfil this task. However, it also has to be said that 
the notion of a permanent president of the European 
Council has been a very contentious issue in the past 
with mainly small member states opposing it for fear 
of having the Commission weakened. 
There are still doubts about a potential rivalry 
between the Commission president and the 
permanent president of the European Council which 
could lead to ‘turf wars’ and less overall efficiency in 
the end. It also seems somewhat contradictory that 
such a potentially problematic structure would be 
created at the highest level while the Constitution 
actually seeks to abolish it in the field of foreign Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? | 3 
 
policy through the creation of the ‘double-hat’ 
foreign minister. The Constitution would also not 
change much of the situation in the Council of 
Ministers with its different formations, as it would 
retain the rotating presidency (Art. I-24.7).
6 Despite 
these concerns, however, the current lack of political 
leadership in the EU reinforces the argument that a 
more diverse Union could potentially benefit from 
clearer structures for the presidency of the European 
Council. 
4. Foreign Minister (Art. I-28) 
Foreign policy is certainly one of the areas that would 
profit most from the Constitution’s innovations. The 
current inefficiencies are, however, not specifically 
linked to enlargement as differences among member 
states have always existed in this policy area. Among 
the ‘old’ EU-15, there were neutral countries as well 
as NATO members. France in particular hoped for an 
independent  ‘Europe puissance’ while the UK 
remained deeply committed to its transatlantic 
approach and the special relationship with the United 
States. Even with the Constitutional Treaty, neither 
before nor after enlargement, could Europe have 
spoken ‘with one voice’ on all foreign affairs issues. 
However, on questions where consensus can actually 
be achieved, the EU is likely to become more 
efficient. One could not claim that the EU has been 
‘deadlocked’ in the field of foreign policy – on the 
contrary, as an increasing number of EU missions 
from Aceh to the Palestinian territories illustrate – 
but inefficiencies in the current institutional set-up 
are not even denied by the actors themselves.
7 As 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, the European 
foreign minister would be in a position to identify 
potential problems among member states at an earlier 
stage and develop an approach that would help to 
avoid open clashes, such as those that erupted during 
the Iraq crisis. With 25 member states, the potential 
for dissent (e.g. on EU-Russia relations or the Cyprus 
issue) has become greater, so that structures allowing 
for an early internal exchange and coordination 
would contribute to greater efficiency. 
5. ‘Permanent structured cooperation’ on 
security and defence policy (Art. I-41.6) 
Despite much activity in the field of foreign policy in 
recent years, the EU’s progress on defence policy 
remains limited. The new defence agency aims to 
make military spending in the EU member states 
more efficient and to avoid duplication, but a 
coherent approach for a European defence policy is 
                                                        
6 The only exception is the Foreign Affairs Council, which 
would be chaired by the Foreign Minister (I-28.3). 
7 See interview with Javier Solana, E!-Sharp, 
January/February 2006. 
still missing. If reaching this aim proved to be 
impossible with 15 member states, it has certainly not 
become easier with 25. In this particularly sensitive 
policy field, the Constitutional Treaty would provide 
the EU with greater flexibility. While under current 
provisions (Art. 27 b TEU) military and defence 
matters remain entirely excluded from the 
possibilities of an ‘enhanced cooperation’, the 
Constitutional Treaty in its Art. I-41.6 would allow 
for a ‘permanent structured cooperation’ among a 
limited number of member states. The establishment 
of such cooperation could even be enacted with the 
consent of a qualified majority of member states. 
Without such a provision for flexibility, little 
progress on these matters can be expected in the 
foreseeable future. Eventually certain members might 
be tempted to move outside the treaty framework, as 
signalled by the behaviour of France, Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg when divisions between 
member states grew over the Iraq crisis. 
6. Reduction of the number of 
Commissioners (Art. I-26.6) 
Contrary to expectations, it seems not to be the 
Council that has so far encountered the biggest 
problems since enlargement, but rather the 
Commission. Clearly, factors other than enlargement 
have also contributed to the difficulties of the 
Barroso Commission. The problems that arose in the 
course of the approval process by the European 
Parliament already gave it a difficult start. The 
Constitutional referenda in several countries made 
the Commission hesitant to table controversial new 
initiatives and the weak economic performance of 
many member states fostered protectionist behaviour 
among national politicians who found the EU a 
convenient scapegoat. Most recently, the after-shocks 
of the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes left the EU with a 
sense of disorientation for several months. After the 
major achievements in the field of the common 
market and the single currency, the lack of a 
politically attractive and easily communicable mid-
term ‘project’ also seems to be a problematic factor at 
the moment.  
Yet, besides these external aspects, there are clearly 
also internal problems that have become more 
prominent with enlargement. The fact that 
Commissioners now come from 25 different national 
backgrounds has added to the diversity of views 
within the college. Coordination seems to have 
become more difficult – and not only between 
Commissioners from old and from new member 
states – as an increased number of public 
disagreements within the College (e.g. on the future 
of the Constitutional process, on REACH or on the 
services directive) have illustrated in recent months. 
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foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty – would thus 
hold out the potential of making the Commission 
more efficient and more independent from national 
influences. Art. I-26.6 of the Constitution states that 
their number should be reduced to “two thirds of the 
number of Member States” based on a “system of 
equal rotation”. This step, however, would only be 
taken in 2014. Yet, the Protocol on Enlargement to 
the Treaty of Nice is already in power and foresees 
that when the EU includes 27 member states, the 
number of Commissioners will have to be reduced to 
“less than the number of member states”. The 
protocol does not specify how many Commissioners 
there would be exactly, but the advantage over the 
provisions in the Constitutional Treaty is that this 
solution will already come into being with the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania – thus, in 2008 at 
the latest. 
7. Changing future treaties 
The current debate about institutional reform shows 
that a Union of 25 veto players under the shadow of 
complex national ratification requirements is not well 
placed to adapt flexibly to change. The Constitutional 
Treaty would bring some procedural progress 
through the possibility of changing provisions on the 
EU’s internal policies (Part III, Title III) such as the 
internal market, EMU or justice and home affairs 
without having to call an intergovernmental 
conference. However, according to Art. IV-445.2, 
unanimous agreement would still be needed for any 
change to the text, which is one of its biggest short-
comings. Clearly, the Constitutional Treaty is an 
evolutionary step forward rather than an institutional 
revolution, so that further changes are likely to 
become necessary in a not too distant future. 
Especially in view of the Constitution’s Part III – 
which deals mainly with the different policies and 
thus goes well beyond the traditional content of a 
constitution – it would have been important to 
introduce a ‘super-qualified majority’ to facilitate 
changes. Yet, even under the Constitution’s 
provisions, the entire treaty acquis would remain 
hostage to national vetoes. Deadlock in this area can 
thus already be predicted.  
II. The importance of the Constitutional 
Treaty beyond the institutional changes 
The analysis of different institutional aspects has 
shown that so far the predicted blockage due to 
enlargement has not materialised. Does this mean 
that there is nothing to worry about for the 
foreseeable future? There are good reasons why one 
should be very cautious to give the EU the all-clear. 
 
1. Long-term implications still unknown 
Never before have so many new members joined the 
Union at once. This has changed the framework and 
the atmosphere for decision-making, namely in the 
Council. So far, the new member states have been 
mostly in a phase of intensive learning – a phase that 
most countries have undergone after joining the 
Union. It cannot be predicted at this stage how 
certain member states will behave once their 
administrative and political systems have developed a 
final routine. On the one hand, it could enhance the 
efficiency of the overall process as an increasing 
level of mutual trust develops, but on the other hand 
the decision-making process could also be slowed 
down, if and when new members should become 
more assertive. 
2. Overall institutional balance 
One cannot only look at the different institutions in 
isolation, but must see them in the context of the 
overall institutional framework of the EU. It is 
especially this delicate institutional balance that gives 
reason for concern. A weakened Commission does 
indeed have implications for the entire institutional 
set-up, since the ‘supranational’ institutions – the 
European Parliament and Commission – are both 
needed to balance the intergovernmental element 
represented by the Council. Moreover, the Council 
and the European Parliament, as the two legislative 
branches of the EU, are dependent on the 
Commission exercising its monopoly of initiative to 
keep the political process going. 
A worrying aspect of the current situation is therefore 
the apparent difficulty of the present Commission to 
define a common internal line and to provide political 
leadership. One of the Commission’s tasks has 
always been to defend the ‘Community interest’, 
which in a European Union of 25 is faced with an 
increasingly broad range of national preferences. 
Commissioners come from a greater variety of 
national backgrounds, and economic disparities 
between member states have become considerably 
wider. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to 
investigate to which extent this increased diversity 
means that the Commission does not dare to propose 
initiatives that might meet resistance from certain 
member states. If the Commission remains as timid 
as it currently appears, however, this could lead to an 
‘invisible’ deadlock: Projects do not get stuck during 
the legislative process, because they got stuck before. 
Controversial initiatives – for example on economic 
issues – thus would be ‘filtered out’ even before a 
proposal is officially tabled.  
Moreover, a hesitant Commission will further tempt 
member states to revert to intergovernmental 
cooperation outside the treaty framework, thus Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? | 5 
 
threatening even elements of the acquis. The danger 
in this scenario is that it could set in motion its own 
disintegration dynamic: In such a context, it would 
become more difficult for the Commission to define 
the ‘common European interest’ and rally the 
necessary support for its policies from member states. 
The EU as a whole would become less efficient and 
effective and would thus lose legitimacy for lack of 
convincing ‘output’. In this sense, an imbalanced 
institutional set-up may not immediately lead to 
deadlock as predicted, but rather to a slow erosion of 
the capacity to act. 
Besides, the trend towards more 
‘intergovernmentalism’ would also mean that the 
established democratic controls would be 
increasingly bypassed. Especially the European 
Parliament would risk being sidelined. By 
concentrating on intergovernmental agreements, the 
democratic deficit would be re-enforced – a trend that 
can currently already be observed in the area of 
justice and home affairs.
8  
The European Parliament itself, however, seems to 
have coped relatively well with enlargement so far. 
Its deliberative nature and its internal organisation in 
committtees and political groups make it well suited 
to deal with the increased national diversity and the 
higher number of MEPs. 
3. The Constitution as a commitment to a 
political union 
Finally, the question remains to what extent the 
commitment for a political union embodied by the 
Constitution would be missed if the project were to 
be abandoned and how this would affect the 
functioning of the EU. Figures from the latest 
Standard Eurobarometre confirm that while there is 
only limited popular support for the continuation of 
the ratification process, support for the concept of a 
European Constitution continues to be high in all 
member states.
9  
Few would contest that the Constitutional Treaty 
would have enhanced the democratic legitimacy of 
the Union. In addition to obvious features like the 
extension of the co-decision procedure, the election 
of the Commission president on the basis of EP 
election results or the citizens’ initiative (Art I-47.4), 
articles providing for a more transparent division of 
competencies and more coherent and understandable 
                                                        
8 Thierry Balzacq, Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth 
Guild, Security and the Two-Level Game: The Treaty of 
Prüm, the EU and the Management of Threats, CEPS 
Working Document No. 234, January 2006. 
9 Standard Eurobarometre 64, December 2005 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/e
b64/eb64_en.htm). 
legal bases for the Union’s actions can be mentioned 
in this context. In fact, the abolition of the ‘pillar 
structure’ of the current treaties has been named by 
some observers in the institutions as one of the key 
innovations of the Constitution, and it is clear why: 
Effective democratic control of the Union’s activities 
is only possible if it is clear who does what and to 
what extent. If the Constitution were not to enter into 
force, the ‘democratic loss’ would thus not only be a 
loss in substance, but also a loss in transparency.  
Many of the decisions taken at the European level 
involve deep political choices, which require a 
democratic legitimisation that is independent (or at 
least distinct) from that of the individual member 
states. If this legitimisation cannot be provided, 
fading popular support and a growing resistance to 
EU decisions are likely to be the result, which then 
ultimately also affects the EU’s efficiency. 
III. Conclusion: Will an enlarged Union 
without the Constitution give rise to 
intergovernmentalism? 
As the current debate shows, there are considerable 
divisions among political leaders on the EU’s 
institutional future and it seems unlikely that the 
Constitutional Treaty will come into force within the 
next two or three years – if at all (see Annexes 1 & 
2). If no agreement can be reached, the enlarged EU 
might even have to put up with the provisions of the 
Treaty of Nice for quite a while. At first sight, this 
might not be so dramatic, as so far the predicted 
deadlock cannot be detected. The Constitutional 
Treaty would improve the efficiency of the individual 
institutions to some degree, but – at least in the short 
run – it would not offer solutions for a considerable 
number of the current problems. Namely, it would 
not introduce majority voting to those policy areas 
that have turned out to be particularly contested in 
recent months.  
These initial observations, however, should not lead 
to the conclusion that the loss of the Constitutional 
Treaty would not have serious implications. 
Institutions have to be regarded in relation to each 
other and there clearly is a problem with the balance 
between the EU’s institutions at present. Surprisingly 
for many, it is not the Council that gives the weakest 
impression, but the Commission. While enlargement 
is certainly not the only reason for the relative 
weakening of the Commission, the conditions of the 
enlarged Union seem to have more of a negative 
impact on the Commission’s supranational role than 
they have on the intergovernmental bargaining within 
the Council. Under these conditions, it has become 
more difficult for the Commission to define and 
defend the ‘common European interest’. 6 | Kurpas & Schönlau 
 
In view of the limited prospects for restarting the 
Constitutional process altogether, the ultimate failure 
of the current text would not only mean the loss of 
the sum of its parts, but also the loss of a highly 
visible symbol of the EU’s cohesion and its aim of an 
‘ever closer union’. Consequently, it would be the 
supranational dimension of the EU’s institutional 
system that would suffer most. In the long-term, not 
only the text itself but also the political context in 
which the institutions have to operate, matter for the 
efficient functioning of the enlarged EU. The current 
effort to reform the EU’s institutions would miss this 
important symbolic aspect if leaders concentrated 
only on salvaging isolated elements of the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
*** 
Annex 1. Overview of the debate 
The immediate reaction of most political actors at 
both national and European levels to the ‘no’ votes in 
France and the Netherlands was speechlessness 
followed by a gradual process of coming to terms 
with the implications of the results. The European 
Council’s announcement of a phase of reflection on 
18 June 2005, was followed by a period of mainly 
silent brooding throughout the British Presidency. 
After this prolonged silence, an increasing number of 
national politicians as well as some European 
Commissioners and MEPs have recently begun to 
position themselves concerning the future of the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
1. Developments against ratification 
Signals from the two key countries – France and the 
Netherlands – have not been encouraging. In 
January the Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot 
made clear that the Constitutional Treaty was dead 
for his government and that ‘cherry-picking’ of 
different elements was equally unacceptable.
10 
Instead, the Dutch government has taken a rather 
defensive stand and is concentrating on a better 
enforcement of the subsidiarity principle.
11 The 
French President has not been as outspoken, but 
implied an ultimate failure of the current text when 
he proposed to take decisions for the improvement of 
the EU’s institutional functioning already during the 
European Council meeting in June 2006 “on the basis 
of the existing treaties”.
12  
                                                        
10 “The Hague says constitution is dead”, 11 January 2006 
(www.euobserver.com). 
11 The Dutch government organised jointly with the British 
EU presidency a high-profile conference on this issue 
under the title “Sharing Power in the Europe”, 17 
November 2005 in the Hague. 
12 Jacques Chirac, ibid. 
Clearly, these governmental positions have to be put 
in context: there will be elections in May (the 
Netherlands) and June (France) 2007, and significant 
changes in the political set-up are likely in both 
cases. Hopes have been expressed that after these 
events, newly elected actors would use their fresh 
mandates to take action on the constitutional issue 
and might even put the current text to a second vote. 
However, so far signals point in a different direction. 
On the French centre-right, Nicolas Sarkozy as one of 
the key contenders for the presidency has positioned 
himself against a second referendum on the same 
text. Yet, unlike Chirac, he does not only want to take 
the existing treaties as a point of departure but also 
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty. According to 
Sarkozy, the new text would then have to be ratified 
by parliament only, thereby possibly avoiding a 
second referendum.
13 After the European elections in 
2009, a new Convention should then be convened to 
elaborate solutions on a ‘super-qualified majority’ for 
fiscal matters, on future EU financing and on the 
borders of the European Union.
14 Sarkozy’s main 
opponent on the political right, Prime Minister 
Dominique de Villepin, has been less clear, but he 
seems to be in line with Chirac’s position in calling 
for means for a stronger European foreign policy “in 
the frame of the existing treaties”.
15 De Villepin 
acknowledged the interest of German chancellor 
Angela Merkel not to give up on a treaty that has 
been approved by both German chambers of 
parliament, but he also pointed to the “constraints and 
wishes of the different states” as well as the “respect 
for the aspirations of our peoples”.
16  
In both France and the Netherlands, political actors 
from the centre-left seem to be even less willing to 
make the unpopular decision of calling for a second 
referendum, as left-wing voters have 
disproportionately voted against the text. Especially 
the French PS has been deeply divided on this issue 
and is unlikely to risk another such rift. At a party 
congress in Le Mans in November 2005, a common 
motion was passed that accepted the outcome of the 
French referendum and called for the restart of the 
entire drafting process.
17 
                                                        
13 Nicolas Sarkozy, Les Voeux à la Presse, Paris, 12 
January 2006 (http://www.u-m-p.org/site/ 
GrandDiscoursAffiche.php?IdGrandDiscours=164). 
14 Nicolas Sarkozy, speech delivered at the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, Berlin, 16 February 2006 
(http://www.botschaft-frankreich.de/IMG/ 
sarkozy_europa_berlin_fr.pdf). 
15 Dominique de Villepin, speech delivered at Humboldt 
University, Berlin, 18 January 2006. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Parti Socialiste, ‘Motion Finale du Congrès du Mans’, 28 
November 2005. Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? | 7 
 
Besides the developments in France and the 
Netherlands, there is another possibility that makes 
the future of the Constitutional Treaty look even 
more difficult: namely, that of new governments 
coming to power which do not feel politically 
committed to ratification in their country anymore.  
In  Poland, this is already the case since Lech 
Kaczyinski of the eurosceptic Law and Justice Party 
(PiS) won the presidential elections in October 2005. 
PiS never supported the Constitutional Treaty and 
both PiS and the main opposition party, the liberal 
Civic Platform (PO),
18 believe that the EU can 
continue to function on the basis of the treaty of Nice. 
Recently Kaczynski called for a new constitution for 
which negotiations should start from scratch and 
which should better respect the views of the different 
nation states.
19 
A similar development can be expected in the Czech 
Republic, if the mostly eurosceptic centre-right party 
ODS should win the upcoming elections in June 
2006. In both countries, referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty were envisaged, but cancelled 
after the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes. These 
referenda can hardly be imagined to take place – let 
alone to be successful – if the respective governments 
campaigned against the text.  
In the UK  and  Denmark,  the governments have 
already signalled that they have little interest in 
continuing the ratification process. Both would have 
to hold referenda that would be very difficult to win. 
Tony Blair ambiguously stated: “I accept that we will 
need to return to the issues around the European 
Constitution”.
20 The Irish government, under whose 
presidency the Treaty had been successfully agreed, 
has been even less clear about its views, but current 
public opinion figures suggest that a referendum on 
the text would also be difficult to win. In Sweden the 
government has shown no intention to submit the text 
to parliamentary approval unless the French and 
Dutch would make a fresh attempt at ratification. 
In  Germany and Slovakia, difficulties are of a 
different nature. In these countries the parliaments 
have approved the text with strong majorities, but the 
presidents of the two countries have not yet signed 
the ratification laws, because the Constitutional 
Courts were subsequently called to rule on the 
constitutionality of the ratification procedure. In both 
countries petitioners claim that ratification of the 
                                                        
18 The former centre-left government party SLD only 
managed to win 11.3% of the votes. 
19 “Polish president calls for brand new EU constitution”, 
25 January 2006 (euobserver.com). 
20 Tony Blair, speech on the Future of Europe, Oxford, 2 
February 2006 
(http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9003.asp). 
Constitutional Treaty would mean adherence to a 
‘European superstate’ and that – if at all – a binding 
referendum would be required to allow such a step. 
The Court ruling in Slovakia is still expected for 
February 2006,
21 while the German Constitutional 
Court is unlikely to come to a conclusion before 
2007.
22 
At the European level, the Commission has not been 
very visible in the debate since the ratification shock 
and has shown internal divisions on the issue. Last 
August, Commission President Manuel Barroso 
stated publicly during a visit to Warsaw: “In the 
foreseeable future we will not have a Constitution. 
That’s obvious. I haven’t come across any magic 
formulas that would bring it back to life.”
23 Instead of 
“never-ending debates about institutions”, he urged 
Europe to “work with what we’ve got”.
24  
The first Vice-President and Commissioner for 
Communication Margot Wallström has been less 
outspoken and is concentrating on keeping the 
Commission's options open. Her contribution for the 
reflection period – ‘Plan D’ for democracy, dialogue 
and debate – was clearly placed in the constitutional 
context but also indicated that it was not a ‘rescue 
plan’ for the Constitution. It therefore does not 
contain any statements as to what should happen to 
the text, but rather a series of measures to improve 
citizens’ involvement in EU politics and the 
responsiveness of the Union’s institutions. 
The first Commissioner to come forward with 
concrete suggestions on the Constitution was French 
Commissioner Jacques Barrot. However, he clearly 
did not speak on behalf of the whole college, when he 
proposed in an interview in January 2006 that single 
elements should be taken from the Constitutional 
Treaty.
25 These contradictory and ambiguous 
messages have added to the general impression that 
little leadership can be expected from the 
Commission on this issue. 
2. Developments in favour of ratification 
On the other hand, there have also been some 
positive indications for the ratification process lately. 
Governments in member states that had already 
ratified before the two ‘no’ votes have repeatedly 
                                                        
21 “Estland behandelt Europese Grondwet in februari, 
Slowakije worstelt met definitieve goedkeuring”, 18 
January 2006 (http://www.grondweteuropa.nl). 
22 Phone interview with a spokesperson from the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 12 January 2006. 
23 “Barroso pessimistic about future of EU constitution”, 1 
September 2005 (www.euobserver.com). 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Paris schert bei Verfassung aus”, Kurier, 2 January 
2006 (http://www.kurier.at/oesterreich/1232173.php). 8 | Kurpas & Schönlau 
 
stated their interest in a continuation of the process.
26 
In January political leaders from almost all upcoming 
EU presidencies expressed their clear commitment to 
this.  Austrian  and  German Chancellors Wolfgang 
Schüssel and Angela Merkel, as well as Portuguese 
Prime Minister José Socrates and Slovenian Foreign 
Minister Dimitrij Rupel have unmistakably stated 
their will to revive the Constitutional Treaty.
27 The 
only upcoming presidency that takes a more nuanced 
stand is the Finnish one. Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen has called for flexibility on the side of 
countries that have already ratified, proposing that 
possible changes to the existing text might have to be 
made.
28 Finnish president Tarja Halonen cautioned 
against pre-empting the ‘period of reflection’. 
Another development in favour of ratification is the 
continuation of the process in several small countries 
even after the French and Dutch referenda. 
Luxembourg held a successful referendum
29 and 
Latvia,
30  Cyprus
31 and Malta
32 approved the 
document by parliamentary vote. After the approval 
of the Flemish parliament on 8 February 2006, 
ratification in Belgium is imminent and in Estonia 
parliamentary ratification is expected in the coming 
months.
33  
At the European level, there is a strong majority 
among the members of the European Parliament 
supporting the continuation of the ratification 
procedure. After intensive debates, the Parliament 
adopted its position on the period of reflection in 
January 2006. In the resolution based on a report by 
Liberal MEP Andrew Duff and Green MEP Johannes 
Voggenhuber, the EP calls for the extension of the 
period of reflection for the whole of 2006 and 
possibly into 2007. It demands that no decision 
should be taken before with regard to the fate of the 
                                                        
26 The following countries have ratified as of mid-February 
2006: Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Spain. Germany 
and Slovakia have obtained parliamentary approval, but the 
ratification law has not yet been signed by the countries’ 
presidents. In Belgium the formal signing of the ratification 
law still needs to take place. 
27 “Slovenia joins constitution revival camp”, 12 January 
2006 (www.euobserver.com). 
28 “Finnish presidency to accept changes in constitution 
text”, 29 January 2006 (www euobserver.com). 
29 10 July 2005; final approval by Parliament on 25 
October 2005. 
30 2 June 2005. 
31 30 June 2005. 
32 6 July 2005. 
33 The first reading of the bill is scheduled for 8 February 
2006, and its adoption has been recommended by the 
Constitutional Commission of the Estonian Parliament on 
16 January 2006. 
text. The EP also pledges to mobilise the debate by 
organising joint conferences with national 
parliaments to discuss six questions of general 
importance for the future of the EU.
34 The debates in 
the European Parliament showed that many different 
views on the way forward exist, but in the end the EP 
reaffirmed its commitment to reach a constitutional 
settlement for the Union. This should be reached at 
the latest before the next European elections in 2009 
and preferably on the basis of the Convention's draft. 
*** 
Annex 2. Scenarios for the future 
Based on the analysis of the broad spectrum of 
opinions, essentially five scenarios for the future of 
the process can be identified, as sketched out below. 
A combination of the different scenarios in several 
subsequent steps has also been suggested already.
35 
1. Continuation on the basis of the Nice 
Treaty 
In the absence of an agreement on the way forward, 
the enlarged EU might well have to function for quite 
some time under the current rules. If no political 
leadership is provided, only a visible institutional 
deadlock at the European level could force national 
leaders to come to a common solution. 
2. Complete renegotiation  
Already the fact that this scenario is proposed by 
political actors as diverse as the French Socialist 
Party on the one hand and Polish President Lech 
Kaczinsky on the other, illustrates how small the 
chances would be for a ‘better agreement’ finding 
common support. In fact, there is not even agreement 
on the process. In the event of a full renegotiation, 
certainly a new Convention would be demanded by 
Members of the European Parliament with calls for 
an elected Convention membership and a clearer 
mandate for the body already being voiced. Others 
would prefer a new treaty to be negotiated by an IGC 
only. In any case, decision-makers would risk getting 
stuck in lengthy negotiations with little prospect of 
reaching agreement. Currently it does not seem that 
there is much appetite among the heads of state and 
government to go down this road after the bruising 
experience of last year. 
                                                        
34For example, the goal of European integration, the future 
of the European social model, Europe’s role in the world or 
the boundaries of the EU. 
35 For example, Nicolas Sarkozy proposes a ‘3-step-
approach’ including scenario 1 (as a first step for the 
immediate future), scenario 3 (as a second step until 
2008/09) and possibly scenario 2 (as a potential third 
step after the EP elections 2009), see also page 7. Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? | 9 
 
3. ‘Cherry-picking’ different elements 
If political leaders should decide in June 2006 not to 
extend the time limit for ratification beyond 
November 2006, this approach would be a likely 
option for the mid-term perspective. At first sight, it 
seems to be a pragmatic ‘quick-fix’ solution to secure 
the most important elements of the Constitution and 
it enjoys increasing support not only from a number 
of national leaders, but also from politicians at the 
EU-level.
36 The problem, however, remains that there 
is still no agreement on what the ‘most important’ 
elements actually are. The ones mentioned by 
Commissioner Barrot – the permanent presidency of 
the European Council or the extension of qualified 
majority voting – were indeed among the most 
contested elements during the constitutional 
negotiations and were only agreed because of other 
elements that appealed to other stakeholders. The 
delicate balance of the constitutional package would 
be lost and difficult to re-establish. Moreover, 
concentrating on elements that do not require treaty 
change – as French President Chirac seems to 
propose – would not lead far, because most key 
elements would require treaty changes and thus an 
intergovernmental conference with subsequent 
ratification in the member states.
37  
4. Ratifying the present text, possibly with 
additional protocols, e.g. on the EU’s social 
dimension 
This solution would only be possible if leaders agree 
to postpone the deadline for ratification beyond 
November 2006.
38 A first serious attempt at reviving 
the Constitutional Treaty could then be made after 
the elections in France and the Netherlands at the 
European Summit in June 2007, under the presidency 
of Germany. As shown above, signals from French 
and Dutch politicians suggest that there is very little 
interest on their side to revive the process even then. 
The proponents of this approach hope to convince 
Dutch and especially French voters through the 
addition of a ‘social protocol’ to the current text. 
                                                        
36 Besides Commissioner Jacques Barrot also the EU’s 
High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, has 
recently given indications in favour of this approach, see 
“Solana bids to make the EU a player on the world stage”, 
interview with Javier Solana, E!-Sharp, January/February 
2006 (http://www.peoplepowerprocess.com). 
37 See for more detail, Sebastian Kurpas, What could be 
saved from the Constitutional Treaty if ratification failed? 
The Problems with a Plan B, CEPS Policy Brief No. 70, 
May 2005. 
38 While it is unlikely that 4/5 of member states will have 
ratified by then (i.e. the share of countries mentioned in 
‘Declaration 30’ to the Constitutional Treaty necessary for 
referring the matter to the European Council), the heads of 
state and government could still decide to extend the 
deadline. 
Whether this will be sufficient however remains 
doubtful. If such a protocol were to have only a 
declaratory character, it would probably not be very 
convincing. If it were to be binding, it would 
certainly meet the opposition of several countries and 
would probably necessitate additional steps of 
ratification in the other member states as well. If it 
were only to be signed by some member states and 
therefore establish some sort of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’, it would raise difficult questions on 
how meaningful it could be in practice in view of the 
general treaty obligations.
39 
5. Part I (& Part II) as the basis of the future 
Constitutional Treaty 
This approach could offer a compromise solution 
between the proponents of ‘cherry-picking’ and those 
who insist on ratification of the current text in its 
entirety. However, it brings with it many complex 
legal questions, because the existing treaties would 
have to remain in force and would have to be 
‘adapted’ to the provisions of the new treaty. Some 
warn against legal incoherence between the different 
legal sources
40, others caution against a possible 
‘hierarchy of norms’ which would ultimately call 
provisions from the existing treaties into question.
41 
Yet others argue that such an approach would bring 
in the Constitutional Treaty ‘through the back-door’. 
Politically, referenda in France, the Netherlands and 
other countries could hardly be avoided. Legally, this 
approach would mean a difficult, but not an 
impossible task. 
                                                        
39 Member states that would sign such a protocol would 
still have to fulfil all their obligations under the existing 
treaties, e.g. the provisions for the single market. 
40 In case all treaties were to be considered as ‘equal’ 
sources of law. 
41 If the new treaty was to prevail over the other treaties in 
case of conflicting provisions.  
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